What is the thesis of federalist 51
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.
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Federalist 51 annotated
Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. Federalist Papers: No. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Madison emphasized that a system of checks and balances would prevent this from happening and he uses the quote to show that checks and balances are necessary because men are not necessarily all angels. If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.
There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable.
Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another.
A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. It is the end of civil society. We also see this idea of checks in balances in other countries, prior to the establishment of this system in the United States.
It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. Please improve it by verifying the claims made and adding inline citations.
Federalist 51 reading guide answers
The inclusion of this theory in Federalist 51 is merely a reiteration of a sentiment that was already present on an international scale. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. Federalist No. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? Of all The Federalist papers, No. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. Please improve it by verifying the claims made and adding inline citations. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. Political philosophers such as Locke and Rousseau had ideas that related to this proposal.
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